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It has become common to measure the quality of exports using their unit export value (UEV). 
Applications of this method include studies of intra-industry trade (IIT) and analyses of 
industrial ‘competitiveness’. This literature seems to assume that export quality and export 
price (the most natural interpretation of UEV) are not merely correlated but that they follow 
each other one-for-one. We put this assumption under scrutiny from both a theoretical and 
empirical point of view. In terms of theory, we formalize this assumption as a hypothesis of 
the proportionality of equilibrium prices and equilibrium qualities. We discuss several cases 
for which this hypothesis is theoretically doubtful (non-linear utility- and cost functions; strong 
and asymmetric horizontal product differentiation). We also suggest two methods of verifying 
the hypothesis for cases in which it cannot be easily rejected theoretically. These two 
methods are then applied to German imports in the period of 1994-2006. We find that the 
implications of the proportionality hypothesis are largely contradicted by the data. 






The goal of this paper is to contribute to the methodology used in empirical analyses of 
international trade. We attempt to examine one of the principal indicators used in this 
literature, unit export value (UEV), and in particular its popular use as a measure of the 
quality of an export product.  
UEV is a basic tool that is used in the studies of intra-industry trade (IIT) that seek to divide 
this kind of trade into vertical and horizontal components (e.g. Greenaway, Hine, Milner 
1993, Fontagné, Freudenberg, Gaulier 2002). UEV is also frequently used to measure export 
quality in empirical research into the “export performance” and international 
“competitiveness” of industries (see Aiginger 2000, Dullek et al 2005).  
It should be stressed that it is not about the mere correlation between export price (which is 
the most natural interpretation of UEV) and export quality: the literature quoted above 
assumes that export quality can be measured by export unit values. As stated by Fontagné, 
Freudenberg, and Gaulier (2002), ‘differences in prices within one product category mirror 
differences in quality’ (emphasis added). The implications of such assumptions are 
numerous. For one it becomes possible to distinguish between goods of similar quality and 
those of different quality by setting a limit on the permitted difference in their UEVs. This is 
done in the studies on vertical and horizontal IIT. More generally, this assumption makes it 
possible to draw conclusions from the observed differences in UEVs between industries, 
countries and over time (for instance Dulleck et al, 2005, list Central and Eastern European 
countries that improved quality in the early 1990s and those that failed to do so). Note that 
these applications would not be possible had UEVs been only a statistical proxy for quality. 
Given such strong methodological implications, it would seem worthwhile to consider the 
viability of UEV as a measure of quality. This, however, is hardly ever done, even if authors 
are usually aware of the problem. As Fontagné, Freudenberg, Gaulier (2002) say (in a 
footnote): ‘There are numerous reasons leading to slight departures from a strict association 
of prices with quality. Trade economists are accustomed to this simplification’. 
Are trade economists right and is the departure really ‘slight’? Lüthje and Nielsen (2002) offer 
an interesting critique of UEV as a tool for breaking down IIT into vertical and horizontal 
parts. They analyzed the product-level bilateral trade between France and Germany in 1961-
1999, and for each year, they attributed each product to either inter-industry trade, vertical 
intra-industry trade or horizontal intra-industry trade. Then they performed run tests to verify 
if the attribution of goods into categories is stable. Apparently it is not: the hypothesis that the 
attribution is random cannot be rejected in a vast majority of cases. This result suggests that 




the quality of exported/imported products is so unstable. It is not clear, however, why the 
empirical method does not work: is the quality measure fundamentally wrong, is there a 
problem with the definition of vertical and horizontal IIT (cf. Gullstrand 2002 , Azhar and Elliot 
2006), or is there simply a “practical” problem with statistical data (for instance due to 
aggregation, misallocation of goods into trade categories, and measurement units used to 
determine quantity)?  
This last question cannot be resolved as long as one remains in the realm of trade data, but 
we would argue that there is a fundamental conceptual problem with UEV as a measure of 
export product quality. Our critique begins with the observation that prices might not follow 
quality closely if goods are differentiated not only by quality but also by other factors (e.g. 
due to horizontal product differentiation). This might benefit some producers allowing for 
markups higher than those of competitors selling similar quality goods. Even if the demand 
structure does not give an advantage to any producer, then prices might not follow qualities 
one-for-one due to consumers’ “love of variety”. Prices might also reflect international trade 
costs as stressed in the pricing-to-market literature (see Atkeson and Burnstein 2008). Note 
that these costs will differ among the pairs of trading partners. Our empirical results support 
these reservations. We performed two kinds of tests. First, we analyzed the CES function 
with products differentiated by quality (cf. Hallak 2004). We proved that the assumption 
regarding the strict association between equilibrium price and equilibrium quality implies a 
rather restrictive condition about import values. We tested this conclusion by analyzing 
German imports between 1994-2006 and we found that it does not hold true for a vast 
majority of markets.  
Our second test can be potentially applied to a wider class of functions. It is based on a 
simple demand function estimation according to the following logic. Suppose that quality is 
the principal differentiation factor and that UEV is the correct way to measure it. Then for a 
given market, small differences in prices among sellers should not result in substantial 
changes in quantities sold (because quality is the only non-price decision parameter, and 
apparently quality has changed only slightly if price has changed only slightly). In other 
words, we would expect the distribution of E(Q|P) over sellers to be not far from continuous.  
Again, we tested this hypothesis for a possible demand function using German imports 
between 1994-2006 by analyzing the conditional distribution of import quantities on import 
unit values (over countries of origin). We found that for a majority of goods, this distribution is 
strongly discontinuous as it has ‘thresholds’: quantity falls abruptly with an incremental 
increase in export unit value. Since our analysis controlled for exporters’ GDP, population, 
distance from Germany and participation in a free trade area with the EU, one can argue that 




Consequently, the most plausible explanation is that the problem is using UEV as a measure 
of quality. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical 
justification for using UEV as a measure of quality. Section III presents an empirical analysis 
Section IV discusses the results and concludes. 
 
2. Quality measurement and trade theory 
 
 
Although UEV is a popular measure of quality, there has not been much economic modeling 
in support of it. Take the method of breaking down IIT into vertical and horizontal 
components proposed by Abd-El-Rahman (1986)
1. While it has been used by several 
authors, none of them, to the best of our knowledge, has presented a formal model. The 
same applies to the ‘competitiveness’ studies mentioned above.  
It seems natural to look for appropriate models in the trade theory literature. The approach to 
modeling quality offered in this literature follows that of Industrial Organization (e.g. Shaked 
and Sutton 1983 and 1987; Gabszewicz and Thisse 1982, Rosen 1974). In this literature, 
quality is identified with a parameter that enters the demand function and in most cases 
(though not all, see below) the costs function. Formally, consider a market in which a product 
is differentiated. Let varieties (or models) of the product be indexed by Z z∈ . Usually it is 
assumed that 
) ( A P, z z Q Q =   (1) 


















z ≠ < < if 0 . 
In some approaches, the quality parameter also enters the cost function of variety  z , which 
is increasing in both arguments:  
) , ( z z z z A Q C C =  
We can now attempt to express the problem of quality measurement. If price indeed “mirrors” 




0 where * * > ≈ k kP A  (2) 
We have thus arrived at a formalized hypothesis (henceforth: ‘proportionality hypothesis’) 
that can be investigated both theoretically and empirically. Note that this formulation is very 
broad; in particular we have made no assumptions about the nature of equilibrium.  
Since price and quality are co-determined by supply and demand, the proportionality 
hypothesis would be guaranteed if both supply and demand functions were linear in both 
these variables. It is less obvious why (2) would hold in other cases. However some models 
do make it possible, at least theoretically. Flam and Helpman analyze two-way trade in 
vertically differentiated products between two countries (“North” and “South”). There is a 
continuum of varieties ( R Z = ), differentiated by quality only. Producers are identified with 
varieties. Unit costs are constant in quantity but increasing in quality, i.e. 




z A C Q A Q C =  
Wherectr stands for country (North or South). There is also a continuum of consumers, 
differing in income. In equilibrium, complete specialization takes place: models up to a 
certain quality are produced only in the South while above that point, quality production takes 
place only in the North. 
The assumption of a continuum of producers, of which each adds little to the market, implies 
in this kind of model (as shown by Rosen 1974) that products in the long run are priced at the 
minimum average cost, thus at the marginal cost. Hence:  




z A C A C P =  
The price is determined by the supply side only. Therefore the proportionality hypothesis 
could theoretically be true if unit costs were linear in quality. However, the authors assume 
that 
ctr C ˆ  is a convex function. A similar model which has the same implications about prices 
is the one by Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987). 
By contrast in the discrete-choice model by Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse (1981), 
prices are determined solely by the demand side, as costs are assumed to be zero. Contrary 
to the Flam-Helpman model, there is a finite number of varieties (identified with producers) 
enjoying a certain monopoly power over a continuum of consumers, indexed by income. The 
utility of an individual consumer depends on his income but it is linear in quality. Although no 
general analysis is offered, the authors solve a duopoly model and demonstrate that under 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 The method consists in observing the ration of export unit value and the import unit value of goods classified as 
IIT. Values between 0.85 and 1.15 indicate horizontal IIT while values outside this range are an evidence of 




the assumption of a uniform distribution of income, the prices of both varieties are nearly 
proportional to their qualities
2.  
On the other hand, it is clear that even in the two models quoted above, equilibrium prices 
can be proportional to equilibrium qualities only under certain (rather strong) assumptions
3. 
Moreover, both models rely on a more general (also strong) assumption: that products are 
differentiated by quality only.  
However including horizontal product differentiation in the analysis can alter the results 
substantially. We will demonstrate this by referring to an additive discrete choice model 
(following Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1990). Consider a population of consumers 
indexed by W w∈ , choosing among n  varieties of a differentiated good. The choice is made 
by maximizing the consumer’s conditional utility function: 
) ( ) ( w F A P w V i i i i + + − =  (3) 
where  ) (w Fi  is the utility drawn by the consumerw from the consumption of one unit of 
variety  i (where  n i K 1 = ),  i A  is the quality of model i, while  ) (w Fi  is the individual 
valuation of variety i by consumer w and it represents horizontal differentiation of the good. 
It is worth stressing that  ) , , ( 1 n A A K = A  is indeed the same parameter that we introduced in 
formula (1). To arrive at (1) requires aggregating the individual decisions of consumers (cf. 
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1990, pp. 66-70). In addition we assume that each 
consumer buys only one unit of the preferred variety. 
Note that (3) accounts for both, the vertical and the horizontal aspect of product 
differentiation. It seems realistic to assume that goods are differentiated in both dimensions, 
a fact that is somehow overlooked in the empirical literature on international trade, which 
seems to ignore the fact that some goods, by their very nature, might be difficult to ascribe to 
either horizontal or vertical IIT, even in theory.  
For simplicity’s sake we will assume that there are only two sellers and that consumers 
cannot refrain from buying (there is no outside option). In that case the demand for variety 1 
equals the mass of consumers for whom  2 1 V V >  or  
() ( ) ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 > − + − + − − w F w F A A P P  
Now suppose that firms compete in prices with the qualities given and that  2 1 A A > . Even 
though seller 1 offers a higher quality product, she might not be the one that charges a 
higher price in the Nash equilibrium if most consumers have a subjective predilection for 
                                                 
2 While this outcome is relevant for our study, the focus of the Gabszewicz et al. paper is different. The authors 
prove that that under certain assumptions, the number of varieties that can be supported in equilibrium with free 




variety 2, i.e.  ) ( ) ( 1 2 w F w F >
4. While this particular example might seem artificial, it is intuitive 
that prices will not follow qualities one-for-one if consumers subjectively prefer certain 
products over others (even if that does not lead to “reversals” of the kind characterized 
above).  
However the problem with horizontal product differentiation is a more serious one. In fact, 
even when no variety enjoys the preferential interest of consumers, hypothesis (2) might not 
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A P,  (4) 
where  E  is the total amount spent on the good and  1 0 < <γ . This is a “love of variety” kind 
of demand function and this property turns out to be particularly relevant in the context of 
quality measurement. It implies that even if the seller of the worst quality variety chooses to 
charge the highest price in the market, the product will still remain on the market. This 
suggests that measuring quality using prices might be difficult. Indeed, it is easily verified 
that: 
() ( ) m l m l m l Q Q P P A A ln ln ln ln ln ln




γ  (5) 
implying that (2) holds if and only if : 
m m l l l m m l Q P Q P Q Q P P
* * * * = ⇔ =   (6) 
In other words, in the CES model, prices and qualities are proportional if and only if all 
varieties generate exactly the same revenue! 
This observation gives us an idea of how can the proportionality hypothesis can be tested 
empirically. Let (4) represent a given country’s demand for a differentiated good. Each 
variety r  is either imported or domestically produced. We will assume that in the equilibrium 
full specialization takes place. Thus each variety is produced by only one country. Following 
Hallak (2004) and Feenstra (2004) we assume that all models (varieties) produced by one 
country have the same (or similar) quality and the same (or similar) price. Thus if  i M  
denotes the total value of imports from country i, then: 
i i r r i i P Q N M =  
where  i N  is the number of varieties imported from country i and  i r  is any of the varieties 
imported from that country. Note (6) implies: 
                                                                                                                                                          
3 And in fact we would expect that utility is concave in quality. As for unit costs, both convex and concave 












=  (7) 
for any two countries i and  j  exporting to the country under consideration (or for one 
exporting country and the importing country itself). 
Consequently assuming the CES demand function, the hypothesis about proportionality of 
price and quality can be tested using (7). This is done in the next section (for German 
imports). 
The second test we are going to perform can be applied to a wider class of demand 
functions. Again, consider a differentiated good market in an importing country. Suppose the 
demand (1) for variety r   has the following “symmetry” property
5: 
λ E Q A P Q Q r r r ) (
~
) , ( ˆ ) ( A P, A P, =    (8) 
In words, demand for variety r  can be expressed as a product of two functions, one of the 
price and quality of variety r  and one of the entire vector  ) ( A P, , and of E , which is the 
country’s total expenditure on the differentiated good (to the power of  0 > λ ). About both 
functions,  Q ˆ  and Q
~
 we will assume that they are continuous. The CES function and the 
multinomial logit model are among the demand functions that have property (7). 
Again, under perfect specialization and assuming equal prices and qualities within countries: 
λ E Q A P Q N Q N Q
i i i r r i r i i ) (
~
) , ( ˆ ) ( A P, A P, = =  
where  i Q  is the quantity imported from country i. Again, suppose that (2) holds. Then: 
λ E k Q kP P Q N Q
i i r r i i ) (
~
) , ( ˆ P P, ≈    (9) 
 
An implication of (9) is that that small differences in prices among countries should not result 
in substantial changes in quantities sold. In other words, we would expect the distribution of 
E(Q|P) over exporting countries to be not far from continuous. This is the hypothesis we will 
take to data for test. 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 For instance, suppose that  0 2 1 > = − α A A . It can be verified that  * * 1 2 P P >  if  α 2 ) ( ) ( 1 2 > − w F w F  for 
a sufficient number of consumers, while  α 2 1 ) ( ) ( 2 1 < − w F w F  for the remaining ones. 
5 It implies, in particular, that the demand function has the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the 
ration of demands for two varieties depends solely on the prices and qualities of these two models. Competition 
between varieties in this model is “symmetric”: an increase in price (or quality) of a given model increases 
(reduces) demand for all remaining varieties by the same proportion. No variety is privileged due to horizontal 




3. Empirical verification of the proportionality hypothesis 
3.1    Dataset and Sources 
Trade data are taken from the Comext statistics of the Eurostat. All our estimates are done 
on the most disaggregated level available in Comext, i.e. the 8
th digit level of the Combined 
Nomenclature. Comext includes approximately 13900 8
th digit-goods that were exported to 
Germany in at least one year between 1994-2006 but we will limit our analysis to those 
exported by a sufficient number of countries (at least 20). This decision will facilitate 
econometric analyses while the number of remaining goods (3911) is high enough to claim 
the generality of our conclusions. 
Our dataset consists of two parts. First, for those goods for which there were data for more 
than one year a balanced panel was set up. This was the case for about 60% (2374) of 
goods. For the remaining goods our analysis is based on cross-country data for the year for 
which the data was available. 
For each of 183 countries and territories exporting to Germany in 1994-2006, we needed 
data on GDP in current prices and population. These were drawn from the International 
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database. In the World Economic Outlook GDP is 
expressed in US dollars. We convert dollars to euro using the InfoEuro tables of the 
European Commission
6.  
Finally, we needed data on distances between Germany and countries exporting to 
Germany. We used theglobetrotter.de website to determine distances (in km) between Berlin 
and the capital of the country in question. In case of some particularly small and remote 
countries and entities, some simplifying assumptions about GDP, population and distance 
were made. 
3.2    Test for the CES demand function 
 
We started by testing the (7) property of the CES function (assuming the proportionality 
hypothesis). It can be alternatively written: 
j j i i n m n m − = −  (10) 
                                                 
6 While this dataset was created for administrative purposes, it is convenient inasmuch as it contains a consistent 
database of ECU/USD exchange rates from the period before fixing of the Euro-zone exchange rates on 
31.12.1998. Since InfoEuro rates are calculated on a monthly basis, we take the average over 12 months to 




(from now on small letters will denote logarithms of variables). In order to check 
whether j j i i j i n m n m − = − ∀
,
, no statistical procedure is required. It would be enough to 
calculate the values of  i i n m −  for each country and check whether this value is the same for 
all countries. But we shall not apply this procedure: the hypothesis that equality 
j j i i n m n m − = −  is satisfied for each pair  j i,  is in a sense too strong, as errors in 
measurement (e.g. of export) and possible errors in specification have to be taken into 
consideration. Consequently we are going to check if (10) holds approximately. 
Let  () ( ) j j i i ij n m n m d − − − = . Since we take into consideration the possibility of a 
measurement or specification error, we will interpret  ij d  as random variables. Assuming that 
(10) holds, subject to an error in measurement or specification, random variables 
{ } j i dij < :  all have mean zero and equal variances
7. Thus for the cross-country part of our 














can be tested using the standard t-statistics. In the case of panel data, this hypothesis is 
verified for each year separately: if for at least one year it is rejected, then we assume that 
approximated equality (10) does not hold.  
Testing (10) empirically involves making an assumption about  i N . We would expect that 
bigger economies export more varieties (cf. Feenstra 2004 ch. 5). Therefore we will use GDP 
as proxy for  i N  (in the next section we will apply a more sophisticated procedure to 
determine  i N ). 
The results of the test (at the 0.05 significance level) are reported in Table 1. Hypothesis  0 H  
can be rejected for a vast majority of goods (80%), implying that if the demand function is of 
the CES type, then the proportionality hypothesis does not hold. Additionally, we present 





                                                 












Table 1. Percentages of goods for which the proportionality hypothesis in the CES 
model is rejected  
Section  Percentage  
of rejections 
I. Live animals; Animal products   81 % 
II. Vegetable products   73 % 
III. Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; 
Prepared edible fats; Animal or vegetable waxes   82 % 
IV. Prepared foodstuffs; Beverages, spirits and vinegar; Tobacco and 
manufactured tobacco substitutes   82% 
V. Mineral products   74% 
VI. Products of the chemical or allied industries   86% 
VII. Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber and articles thereof   81% 
VIII. Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins and articles thereof; 
Saddlery and harness; Travel goods, handbags and similar containers; 
Articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)  
76% 
IX. Wood and articles of wood; Wood charcoal; Cork and articles of 
cork; Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; 
Basketware and wickerwork  
79% 
X. Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; Recovered (waste 
and scrap) paper or paperboard; Paper and paperboard and articles 
thereof  
83% 
XI. Textiles and textile articles   77% 
XII. Footwear, Headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, 
seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; Prepared feathers and 
articles made therewith; Artificial flowers; Articles of human hair  
84% 
XIII. Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar 
materials; Ceramic products; Glass and glassware   62% 
XIV. Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, 
precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; 
Imitation jewelry; Coin  
69% 
XV. Base metals and articles of base metal   78% 
XVI. Machinery and mechanical appliances; Electrical equipment; Parts 
thereof; Sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles  
80% 
XVII. Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment   78% 
XVIII. Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, 
precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; Clocks and 
watches; Musical instruments; Parts and accessories thereof  
78% 
XIX. Arms and ammunition.; parts and ammunition, parts and 
accessories thereof  83% 
XX. Miscellaneous manufactured articles   74% 
All goods  80% 
Source: Own calculations 
A closer look at Table 1 might be puzzling. Why is the rejection rate relatively the lowest for a 
category consisting of rather homogenous goods (Section XIII)? But in fact this is something 




qualities of all the varieties are similar. If technology is similar around the world, then this 
further implies that prices of all the varieties are similar. This however brings us to (6) and 
(7). We should not have expected hypothesis  0 H  to be massively rejected in homogenous 
industries, because it is likely to be true. 
On the other hand we can see that for categories grouping differentiated goods (such as XVI, 
XVII, XVIII), hypothesis  0 H  can be firmly rejected: it cannot be supported for about 80% of 
goods.  
3.3    Analysis of the continuity of the demand function 
 
Our second test of the proportionality hypothesis (2) is based on the more general equation 
(9), which, assuming the hypothesis is true, can be written for convenience in terms of 
functions of prices only:  
λ E Q P Q N Q
i r i i ) (
~
) ( ˆ P ≈    (11) 
i Q  is the amount of imports from country i and 
i r P  is the price of any of the models imported 
from that country.  
It will be important to distinguish carefully between the number of countries and number of 
varieties. Let L be the number of varieties and J  the number of countries exporting to the 
country under consideration. Thus  
L N N J = + +K 1   
Taking logs of equation (11) we obtain: 
e q P q n q
i r i i λ + + + = ) ( ~ ) ( ˆ P    (12) 
We are going to estimate (12) using German import data
8. To this end we need to make 
assumptions about functions Q ˆ  and Q
~
. We assume that: 
( )
β α

















Bearing in mind the distinction between number of varieties and number of countries we can 
transform the latter formula: 
()
ψ ψ


























                                                 
8 Note that while estimating Germany’s demand we have to do without one key producer – Germany itself. This is 




Taking logs and substituting  into (12) we arrive at: 
∑
=
+ + + + =
J
j
j j i i i e p N p n q
1
λ ψ β κ  (13) 
where:  α ω κ ln ln + = ; for simplicity we use the symbol  i p  instead of 
i r p . 
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1
ψ  are constant and can be 
ignored. This will be different in the panel-data model (see below). 
Just as it was the case with the CES function, we need to make an assumption about  i N . 
This time we do not have to make as restrictive assumptions as in the previous section and 
we can actually estimate the impact of different variables. Consequently we assume that: 
( ) ( ) i i i i i i eu DIST POP GDP N ξ ρ
ρ ρ ρ exp exp 4
3 2 1 =  (14) 
Where  POP stands for population,DIST  for distance between Germany and the exporting 
country,  eu is a dummy that takes a value of one for the countries of the European 
Economic Area (as of 2009) as well as Switzerland and Turkey
9 and zero otherwise, while 
J ξ ξ , , 1 K are i.i.d. error terms with zero mean. 
Strictly speaking, formula (14) combines two different effects. One is the effect of the size of 
the country (measured by its GDP and population). The other is the “border effect” of 
distance and other factors that might influence trade between, in our case, Germany and 
country  i. The “border effect” is usually assumed to influence demand through prices (cf. 
Feenstra 2004, Ch.5) because it is associated, for instance, with higher shipment costs. 
However both approaches lead to the same estimation strategy (at least in our context) so 
we will stick to our formalization, because it enables us to consider different effects in a 
concise form. 
Taking the logs of (14) and plugging it into (13) we arrive at the model:  
i i i i it it i p eu dis pop gdp q ξ β ρ ρ ρ ρ κ + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1    (15) 
(constant variables are ignored) 
                                                 
9 This group can be largely considered to have been a free trade area in 1994-2006: since 1.05.2004 the 27 EU 
member states and Turkey form a customs union while the remaining EEA countries join them in a free trade area 
(excluding agricultural and fishery products; this applies also the customs union with Turkey). Before 2004, 12 of 
the current EU member states were only candidates for accession, but they were in a free trade area with the EU 
based on the Europe Agreements. Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1963. Switzerland is 




To debunk the proportionality hypothesis we will show that, contrary to what the theoretical 
model suggests,  i q  is discontinuous in prices. To demonstrate this we will consider the 
following model with dummy variables: 
i i i i i i it it i D D p eu dis pop gdp q ξ δ δ β ρ ρ ρ ρ κ + + + + + + + + = 2 1 2 1 4 3 2 1   (16) 
where: 
{ } 11 ii Dp p =<  and  { } 21 ii Dp p = >  
Where thresholds  p and  p  are chosen so as to minimize the sum of the squared errors. If 
parameters  1 δ and  2 δ  are significantly different from zero, then the imported quantity is best 
approximated by a function that is discontinuous in price (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Discontinuity of the regression function (16) 
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4 3 2 1 2 1
(19)  
where:  , , , 1 , , , 1 , T t J i v t it it K K = = + = λ ξ  
t U  takes on value 1 in year t and 0 in the rest of periods. About error terms we assume that 
() ( ) I ε ε 0 ε
2 , σ = = ∀
T
j i i i E E  for  J i , , 1K = ,  J j , , 1K =  and 
() . , , 1 , , , 1 , 0 T s T t x E is it i K K = = = ∀ ε   
Model (17) is a so called pooled regression, model (18) is a fixed effects panel data model, 
model (19) is a random effects panel data model.  
Note that the latent variable  j N  is a power function of parameters  4 3 2 1 , , , ρ ρ ρ ρ  (cf. equation 
14). Consequently all the models listed are nonlinear in these parameters. To circumvent this 
problem, we estimate them recursively using the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm  
by Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977), which Amemiya (1984) proved to be convergent.  
Next, for each good we choose the appropriate model among models (17)-(19) depending on 
the statistical inference for panel data analysis (the significance of fixed effects and the 
Hausman test).  
Analogous  to the cross-country model, proving the discontinuity of E(Q|P) in the panel model 
requires rejecting the hypothesis that all deltas equal zero, i.e.: 
01 1 1 2 1 2 :0 , TT H δ δδ δ == = == = KK  
However we will be able to say more about the relation between import price and quantity. 
By testing if parameter β  is statistically significant, we can ascribe each good in the 
database to one of four categories (Table 2).  
Table 2. Classification of goods based on the relation between import price and import 
quantity. 
01 1 1 2 1 2 :0 , TT H δ δδ δ = === == KK  
 
rejected not  rejected 
rejected 




Linearity in intervals 
(B) 
 
0 : 0 = β H  
not rejected  Linearity (hence: continuity) (C)  Strong discontinuity  
(A) 




For goods falling into categories A and B, hypothesis  0 H  can be rejected, thus quantity is 
discontinuous in price. Group B is actually illustrated by  Figure 1 above. The difference 
between B and A is that in the latter, a log-linear relationship between price and quantity 
demanded cannot be established, even within the price “segments”. Therefore we labeled it 
“strong discontinuity”. Category A can be further divided into two subgroups: 
A1: The segments are “monotonic”, i.e. the mean quantity in the price intervals [ ] p , 0 , 
[ ] p p, , [ ] ∞ , p  is falling.  
A2: The segments are nonmonotonic, i.e. the mean quantity is falling at first and then 
increasing or vice versa 
Both A1 and B can be regarded as evidence of the nonlinearity of utility and/or unit costs in 
quality. On the other hand, A2 would indicate a strong and asymmetric horizontal 
differentiation in the market. Finally, category C includes goods for which the relationship is 
log-linear throughout the price spectrum, matching our theoretical model (11), contrary to 
group D, for which all variables are insignificant.  
Table 3 presents cross-country- and panel regression results separately. This distinction is 
motivated by the theory. While panel data analysis requires making assumptions about both 
functions,  Q ˆ  and Q
~
, cross country analysis needs only the former function. As a result, it 
reflects a wider range of demand functions. This might be a reason why option D, indicating 
possible misspecification of the model, is less frequent for a cross-country model. 
Table 3. Percentages of goods belonging to groups defined in Table 2. 
Group 
Estimation method 
A1  A2  B C D 
Cross country regression   30,8% 21,3% 23,2%  6,4%  18,3% 
Panel regression   24,4%  19,2% 29,8%  3,5%  23,1% 
Source: Own calculations 
Generally speaking, for more than 70% of goods analyzed, quantity demanded was 
discontinuous in price. The proportion of those for which continuity can be sustained (group 
C) is very small. Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix present the results broken down by 
Combined Nomenclature sections. This time we would expect homogenous goods to fit well 
into group D, because of little variation in prices and quantities. This is clearly the case for 
Section XIII. Less evident values for other homogenous categories are partly a result of 
aggregation: further disaggregation into 98 chapters  of Combined Nomenclature (not 
reported in a table) reveals that such categories as wood (chapter  44, Section IX) and 
mineral oils and fuels (chapter 27, Section V) have a particularly high proportion of goods in 




It is also worth stressing that in all 98 CN chapters hypothesis  0 H  can be rejected for at least 
50% of goods and in more than a half of chapters it can be rejected for more than 70% of 
goods. By implication, for a large majority of goods, quantity demanded turns out to be 





In this article, we put measuring export quality by unit export value under scrutiny both from a 
theoretical and empirical point of view. We formalized the (usually tacit) assumptions that 
back this method of measuring quality by establishing the ‘proportionality hypothesis’. Then 
we investigated the validity of this hypothesis. We discussed several cases for which the 
assumption of proportionality between equilibrium prices and equilibrium quality is 
theoretically doubtful (non-linear utility- and cost functions; strong and asymmetric horizontal 
product differentiation). We also suggested two methods of verifying the proportionality 
hypothesis for cases when it cannot be easily rejected theoretically and we applied them to 
the analysis of German imports between 1994-2006. 
The first method is applicable exclusively to the CES demand function and it yielded strong 
negative results in the case of German imports (i.e. either the demand function was not CES 
or price and quality were not proportional).  
The second method is based on estimating the demand function. It can potentially be applied 
to a wider range of models in which the competition between varieties of the differentiated 
good is symmetric. The key idea is to analyze the continuity of the conditional distribution 
E(Q|P), because if qualities followed prices closely it should be continuous. Again, the test on 
German data indicated that the distribution is discontinuous for a large majority of goods in 
all trade sections. Note that we controlled for such factors as exporters’ GDP, population and 
border effects (distance from Germany and EU membership or participation in a free trade 
area with the EU).  
One could question the way we formalized the problem of quality measurement and argue 
that the proportionality hypothesis is too strong, and that we are  “shooting at fish in a barrel”. 
We would insist, however, that this hypothesis best reflects  the logic of empirical literature 
using UEV as a quality measure. Moreover, only the first of our test (“the CES-test”) relied 
strictly on proportionality of equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities, while the second 




for a function of prices, as long as this function was continuous in prices (perhaps with some 
additional regularity conditions). 
Which empirical studies are affected by our critique and which are not? First of all, let us 
reiterate that the problem we raised applies only to the attempts to measure quality 
(deterministically) and not to proxy it. On the other hand, our reservations directly address 
the ‘competitiveness’ studies, which, just as our tests, are based on the analyses of one-way 
trade. They also apply indirectly to the IIT studies of two-way trade: if one demand function 
creates problems with measuring quality by UEV, then two demand functions are likely to be 
even worse (or just as bad – consider the case of  trade between countries with similar 
endowments).   
One implication of our study is that a 1% change in price might indicate a change in quality 
that is different in market A than in market B. This yields support for the suggestion by Lüthje 
and Nielsen (2002) to use good-specific dispersion factors when breaking down IIT. On the 
other hand, our results also indicate that within the same market, a similar change in price 
might reflect different changes in quality, depending on the exporter. 
Having said this, our critique is a methodological one. It does not belittle the importance of 
competitiveness of industries nor that of inter-industry trade or its decomposition into vertical 
and horizontal parts (which is relevant, as evidenced by Gullstrand 2002). 
 





Table 4. Percentages of goods belonging to groups defined in Table 2 broken down by 
CN sections – results of the cross-country regression 
 A1  A2  B  C  D 
I. Live animals; Animal products   34%  23%  30%  5%  8% 
II. Vegetable products   36%  19%  34%  4%  7% 
III. Animal or vegetable fats and oils and 
their cleavage products; Prepared edible 
fats; Animal or vegetable waxes  
35% 15% 20% 10% 20% 
IV. Prepared foodstuffs; Beverages, spirits 
and vinegar; Tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes  
38%  19%  23% 5% 15% 
V. Mineral products   28% 25% 11% 16% 19% 
VI. Products of the chemical or allied 
industries   37%  25%  17% 6% 15% 
VII. Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber 
and articles thereof   48%  25%  11% 3% 13% 
VIII. Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins 
and articles thereof; Saddlery and harness; 
Travel goods, handbags and similar 
containers; Articles of animal gut (other 
than silkworm gut)  
35%  17%  26% 7% 15% 
IX. Wood and articles of wood; Wood 
charcoal; Cork and articles of cork; 
Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of 
other plaiting materials; Basketware and 
wickerwork  
33%  22%  20% 7% 18% 
X. Pulp of wood or of other fibrous 
cellulosic material; Recovered (waste and 
scrap) paper or paperboard; Paper and 
paperboard and articles thereof  
38%  25%  20% 3% 14% 
XI. Textiles and textile articles   24%  17%  29%  8%  22% 
XII. Footwear, Headgear, umbrellas, sun 
umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, 
whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; 
Prepared feathers and articles made 
therewith; Artificial flowers; Articles of 
human hair  
28%  21%  22% 4% 25% 
XIII. Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos, mica or similar materials; 
Ceramic products; Glass and glassware  
25%  16%  23% 6% 30% 
XIV. Natural or cultured pearls, precious or 
semi-precious stones, precious metals, 
metals clad with precious metal, and 
articles thereof; Imitation jewelry; Coin  
28%  22%  23% 5% 22% 
XV. Base metals and articles of base metal  28%  20%  32%  2%  18% 
XVI. Machinery and mechanical 
appliances; Electrical equipment; Parts 
thereof; Sound recorders and reproducers, 




 A1  A2  B  C  D 
television image and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and accessories of 
such articles  
XVII. Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and 
associated transport equipment   24%  21%  25% 7% 23% 
 
Table 5. Percentages of goods belonging to groups defined in Table 2 broken down by 
CN sections – results of the panel regression 
 A1  A2  B  C  D 
I. Live animals; Animal products   26%  24%  22%  8%  20% 
II. Vegetable products   27%  16%  28% 5% 24% 
III. Animal or vegetable fats and oils and 
their cleavage products; Prepared edible 
fats; Animal or vegetable waxes  
38%  19%  23% 0% 20% 
IV. Prepared foodstuffs; Beverages, spirits 
and vinegar; Tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes  
29%  20%  27% 3% 21% 
V. Mineral products   27%  19%  26% 2% 26% 
VI. Products of the chemical or allied 
industries   30%  18%  27% 4% 21% 
VII. Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber 
and articles thereof   35%  21%  15% 4% 25% 
VIII. Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins 
and articles thereof; Saddlery and harness; 
Travel goods, handbags and similar 
containers; Articles of animal gut (other 
than silkworm gut)  
27%  14%  32% 7% 20% 
IX. Wood and articles of wood; Wood 
charcoal; Cork and articles of cork; 
Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of 
other plaiting materials; Basketware and 
wickerwork  
22%  20%  33% 3% 22% 
X. Pulp of wood or of other fibrous 
cellulosic material; Recovered (waste and 
scrap) paper or paperboard; Paper and 
paperboard and articles thereof  
25%  19%  29% 6% 21% 
XI. Textiles and textile articles   22%  17%  31%  3%  27% 
XII. Footwear, Headgear, umbrellas, sun 
umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, 
whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; 
Prepared feathers and articles made 
therewith; Artificial flowers; Articles of 
human hair  
25%  20%  28% 4% 23% 
XIII. Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos, mica or similar materials; 
Ceramic products; Glass and glassware  
23%  16%  24% 6% 31% 
XIV. Natural or cultured pearls, precious or 
semi-precious stones, precious metals, 




 A1  A2  B  C  D 
metals clad with precious metal, and 
articles thereof; Imitation jewelry; Coin  
XV. Base metals and articles of base metal  23%  21%  32%  2%  22% 
XVI. Machinery and mechanical 
appliances; Electrical equipment; Parts 
thereof; Sound recorders and reproducers, 
television image and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and accessories of 
such articles  
18%  18%  35% 4% 25% 
XVII. Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and 
associated transport equipment   23%  16%  32% 4% 25% 
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